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INTRODUCTION
Several East European countries have enacted legislation author-
" Management Consultant, Bain & Co., Boston Mass.; B.S., University of
Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Finance; J.D., Harvard Law School.
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izing joint ventures' during the past decades. Yugoslavia first enacted
such legislation in 1967,2 followed by Hungary, Romania, Poland, and
Bulgaria.3 Each nation has adopted its own approach to the problem
of incorporating the equity interests of outside investors. The Polish
approach to investment regulation is the most complex, imaginative,
and liberal of the East European systems. Poland, by authorizing joint
ventures, wholly-owned foreign companies, and foreign-dominated
small business enterprises, has become the first East European country
to incorporate a substantial degree of foreign-controlled capital in its
economy.4
This article explores foreign investment in Poland from the inves-
tor's perspective, focusing on the legal protection of the investor's
stake in a joint venture. Section I addresses the investor's understand-
ing of ownership and the historical development of the protection of
individual and foreign ownership in Poland. Section II explores coop-
erative activities in which investors and East European nations have
engaged in the past and probes the objectives of each party to a coop-
eration agreement. Section III outlines Polish investment regulations.
Section IV provides an overview of other East European nations'
approach to foreign equity holding. Finally, Section V reviews the
types of cooperative agreements and joint ventures entered into during
past decades and analyzes the factors leading businessmen to choose
these investment forms.
1. A joint venture is an association by two or more business partners for some
restricted purpose. That is, it is something less than a full merger or combination of the
firms. Although there are a variety of definitions that can be applied to the term "joint
venture," an operable definition is as follows: A joint venture is
an integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the
following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint control of the
parent firms, which are not under related control; (2) each parent makes a substan-
tial contribution to the enterprise; (3) the enterprise exists as a business entity sepa-
rate from its parents; (4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise
capability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or
entry into a new market. "
Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. Rav. 1521, 1526 (1982) (foot-
note omitted). For a detailed examination of joint ventures in general, see id. at 1524-38.
2. The Law Amending and Supplementing the Basic Law on the Enterprises, Official
Gazette No. 31 (1967); Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Assets of Economic
Organizations, Official Gazette No. 31 (1967); Law Supplementing the Law on the Estab-
lishment of Interest on Funds in the Economy, Official Gazette No. 31 (1967); The Law
Amending and Supplementing the Basic Law on Uniform Chambers of Economy and on
Business Cooperation in the Economy, Official Gazette No. 31 (1967); The Law Supple-
menting the Basic Law on Citizens' Contributions and Taxes, Official Gazette No. 31
(1967), cited in Note, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia: 1971 Amendments to Foreign Invest-
ment Laws, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL'Y 271, 272 n.2 (1973).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 57, 162, 173, 188.
4. See infra Section IV.
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I. THE CONCEPT OF OWNERSHIP
This inquiry into Polish foreign investment regulation focuses on
the extent to which Poland protects an investor's ownership rights.
The analysis begins by examining the benefits of ownership as under-
stood by investors in market economies. In market economies, the
perceived benefits flowing from capital arise from the investor's equity
position. In controlled economies such as Poland's, however, the per-
ceived benefits reside with the state.
A. THE WESTERN PERSPECTIVE
An investor can control his investment by exercising power over
six aspects of business activity: corporate form; market participation;
management; organization and mobility of capital; operations; and
transfer of ownership or liquidation. In a pure laissez-faire system,
investors would enjoy full discretion in the exercise of the rights of
ownership. In reality, however, market economies restrict this discre-
tion.5 Ownership does not guarantee unlimited economic freedom.
5. Antitrust and other principles of fair competition, for example, limit parties' ability
to choose business partners and industries. See generally The Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1982). There are a limited number of corporate forms which an
investment may assume: sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation. See H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 16 (3d ed. 1983). Henn and Alexander further
subdivide these three general groupings from both tax and nontax perspectives. Id Inves-
tors may be restricted from entering certain industries, or required to qualify for special
licenses to engage in those activities. The National Security Agency, for example, forbids
the sale of cryptographs. Note, Public Cryptography, Arms Export Controls, and the First
Amendment: A Need for Legislation, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 197 (1984). Also, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires prior certification of nuclear power facilities. 44
C.F.R. § 350 (1984).
States and the federal government likewise limit the extent of foreign investment in the
United States economy. Foreign firms are therefore restricted from participating in certain
industries, including broadcasting, satellite communication, mining on federal property,
and commercial air traffic. See generally Vagts, United States of America's Treatment of
Foreign Investment, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 374 (1963); Roth, Foreign Investment Regulation
in the United States, 4 CORP. L. REv. 178 (1981). Investors' control in domestic corpora-
tions is also restricted. State statutes regulate conduct at company meetings, ensure mini-
mum shareholder voting rights, and outlaw corporate decisions that disproportionately
harm minority interests. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 211, 212 (1983); see also
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978) (providing for disclosure of
relevant data to minority shareholders); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir.
1947) (creating a fiduciary duty to minority stockholders). General organizational require-
ments are minimal; companies only need to file a charter or articles of incorporation before
initiating operations. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-07 (1983); see generally H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra, §§ 116-18 (setting forth the incorporation procedures in
more general terms).
Economic regulation significantly affects corporate operations. Zoning ordinances
restrict the location of investment facilities. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
and Internal Revenue Service regulations dictate corporate accounting procedures. H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra, § 319. Numerous statutes establish minimum conditions
under which a workforce must be hired and maintained. For example, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Employee Retirement Income
1985]
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Instead, investors are permitted to exercise limited economic rights
that are consistent with the state's interest in maintaining an orderly
economy.
Market economies offer no guarantees that laws affecting an
investor's discretion will not change, although investors' expectations
may be to the contrary. In the United States, for example, a govern-
mental action may reduce the value of an investment without consti-
tuting a compensable taking of property.6
B. THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE
The principle of state ownership and administration of all major
aspects of the economy pervades Polish economic regulation. The
Polish Constitution describes the economic system as founded on the
principles of state ownership of productive assets and a socialized sys-
tem of production.7 The state is responsible for ensuring the economic
and social welfare of its citizens by means of a national economic plan.
The state also enjoys a monopoly over foreign trade.8 The state, in
order to maintain a planned economy, oversees product distribution,
manufacturing, and the pricing of domestic goods and services.
Security Act, and Title VII to the Civil Rights Act all establish guidelines regarding the
workforce. Proposed state and federal plant-closing legislation attempt to minimize the
economic disruption resulting from factory shutdowns, while Food and Drug Administra-
tion regulations, Federal Aviation Administration pronouncements and product testing
requirements ensure that products conform to minimum safety levels. Finally, federal and
state taxes are assessed on investment proceeds. Investors wishing to transfer property to
another party may be subject to taxes on capital appreciation, gift, or estate values, and
may face antitrust restrictions with respect to transactions with certain partners.
6. Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). For example, a community may
reroute a major thoroughfare away from an existing production facility; the Food and Drug
Administration may ban the sale of a previously approved product; Congress may raise
taxes or impose wage and price controls; a community may ban the sale or manufacture of
certain products, such as pornographic materials, drug paraphernalia, or even nuclear
research.
7. Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, art. XII, Dziennik Ustaw (Journal
of Laws) No. 7, it. 36 (1976). Polish laws and ministerial pronouncements are published in
two journals: Dziennik Ustaw (Dz. U.) and Monitor Polski (Official Journal - M.P.).
Laws are identified by journal number, item, and year.
The hierarchy of Polish legal pronouncements begins with a Law (Ustawa), which is
enacted by the Polish Parliament, the Sejm. A Decree of the Council of Ministers
(Uchwala) also establishes a new legal position in Poland. A Resolution of the Council of
Ministers (Rozporzadzenie) addresses a given legal framework. An Order of a Minister
(Zarzadzenie) provides executive guidelines for implementation of a resolution or decree,
and an Explanation (Oswiadowidzenie) details the application of an existing law or regula-
tion in a given setting. P. MARER & E. TABACZYNSKI, POLISH-U.S. INDUSTRIAL COOPER-
ATION IN THE 1980s 349 (1981).
Hereinafter, laws will be fully cited in the first instance, with only titles appearing in
subsequent references.
8. Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, art. XII, Dz U. No. 7, it. 36
(1976).
POLISH FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The Polish approach to private ownership will be analyzed from
two perspectives: personal ownership of'real and productive assets,
and foreign participation in national economic development. The
Constitution expressly protects limited rights to own and inherit land,
buildings, and productive assets related to crafts and trades.9 Regula-
tions have defined property subject to personal ownership to include
any means of production that are not the object of exclusive state
ownership.10
Foreign persons in Poland enjoy similar rights. Laws enacted in
the 1920s and 1930s permit foreigners residing in Poland, and corpo-
rations doing business there, to purchase real property upon approval
by the Minister of Internal Affairs.1 ' Foreign nationals and corpora-
tions may also negotiate a perpetual lease for real property.' 2 A per-
petual lease runs for ninety-nine years 13 and is renewable for a period
of forty to ninety-nine years. Fees applicable to the sale or lease of real
property vary according to its type and location, within guidelines
established by regulations of the Ministry.' 4 Provisions authorizing
foreign ownership of real property have been widely publicized by
Inter-Polcom, the Polish-Polonian Chamber of Commerce, in its
attempt to encourage foreign investment.' 5
Laws enacted in the 1920s and 1930s also allowed foreign equity
participation. Under the Industrial Law of 1927, foreigners enjoyed
equal investment status with Polish citizens, provided that Poles were
accorded reciprocal rights in the investor's state. 16 Foreign individu-
als and corporations were permitted to request a license to establish a
joint stock company or a limited liability company.' 7
The approach to foreign investment remained unchanged until
1972, when the Industrial Law of 192718 was replaced by the Law on
9. Id., art. XVII.
10. Polish Civil Code § 130 (1964), Dz. U. No. 16, it. 93 (1964); Burzynski & Juergen-
smeyer, East-West Industrial Co-operation: The Polish Example, 1 Loy. L.A. INTL &
COMP. L. ANN. 37, 51 (1978).
11. Law of 24 Mar. 1920, Dz U No. 24, it. 202 (1933). This provision expressly sur-
vived repeal at the time of the implementation of the Civil Code, according to Law of 23
Apr. 1964, Dz U. No. 16, it. 94, art. VII, § 2(1) (1964).
12. Polish Civil Code § 232-43.
13. Id.
14. Decree No. 112 of the Council of Ministers of 20 July 1979, DZ U. No. 18, it. 109
(1979). See generally INTER-POLCOM, DOING BusiNESS IN POLAND 7 (1980).
15. No data regarding the scope of such real estate holdings have been reported.
16. Industrial Law of 1927, DzU No. 23, it. 64, § 4 (1927).
17. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 20 Dec. 1928, Dz U No. 103, it. 919
(1928); Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 28 Mar. 1934, D U. No. 31, it. 281
(1934). These principles were incorporated in the Commercial Code of 1934, Dr U. No. 57,
it. 502 (1934).
18. Industrial Law of 1927, Dz U. No. 23, it. 64, § 4 (1927).
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Conduct and Organization of Handicraft and Small Business19 and the
Law on Conduct of Commerce and Other Activity by Non-Socialist
Entities.20 These acts established procedural guidelines under which
the Council of Ministers could permit foreign individuals and corpora-
tions to invest in Poland. 21 Based on the powers delegated under these
acts, the Ministers issued regulations governing the operation of for-
eign-owned companies and joint ventures in Poland.22 Polish minis-
ters enjoy the power to authorize a wide range of foreign investment,
although the influx of foreign equity into the economy began only after
the express statutory authorization of wholly foreign-owned
companies. 23
Statutory treatment of private ownership and foreign investment
has remained substantially unchanged since the 1920s, despite the
institution of the Communist regime in 1952. Poland's private invest-
ment by foreigners clearly violates Marxist-Leninist tenets of state
ownership of property and the means of production. The Soviet
Union, by comparison, has adopted the strictest approach to foreign
investment of any COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance) nation. It prohibits all foreign equity holdings.24
Polish commentators have avoided discussion of the ideological
inconsistency between Marxist-Leninist teaching and Polish practices
with respect to foreign investment. Indeed, their candid statements
about the benefits of foreign investment imply a disregard for orthodox
ideology. For example, one author quoted the Deputy Minister of
Trade as saying that "[n]othing stands in the way of joint ventures.
We are ready to consider every proposition which is technologically
and economically beneficial. But we have yet to receive such an offer
from a Western economy."'25 In what appear to be subtle attempts to
justify Poland's unorthodox practices concerning foreign investment,
some authorshave pointed out that other COMECON nations have
similar practices.26 Others have simply detailed Poland's long history
19. Law on Conduct and Organization of Handicraft and Small Business of 8 June
1972, Dz U No. 23, it. 164 (1972).
20. Law on Conduct of Commerce and Other Activity by Non-Socialist Entities of 18
July 1974, Dz U. No. 27, it. 15 (1974).
21. Poland's POLIMEX-CEKOP trading agency was recruiting American companies
to invest in Polish joint ventures as early as 1972. Poland Signs Up with U.S. Business,
Business Week, Nov. 11, 1972, at 51-52.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 54-80.
23. See infra Section V.
24. See infra pp. 93-94.
25. Schwartz, 7 Form kooperacfi z krajami socjalistycznymi, 21 HANDEL ZAGRAN-
IczNY, No. 10 1976, at 19 (author's translation).
26. Bukowski, Z problemow tworzenia i funkcjowania joint ventures, 27 HANDEL
ZAGRANICZNY, No. 3 1981, at 15; Zagorski, Kooperacja przemyslowa i transfer technologii
miedzy wschodem a zachodem, 22 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 4 1977, at 17-18; Ser-
oczynski, 0 koncepcii wspolnych przedsiewziec a przemyslem w krajach kapitalistzycznych,
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of permitting foreign investment.27
Western commentators have taken ideology more seriously than
have their Polish counterparts. In 1972, Kretschmar and Foor noted
that "Marxist-Leninist ideology . . . will probably never stretch far
enough to allow foreign capitalists to own a share in the means of
production of a socialist state; therefore, if a businessman persists in
demanding true ownership, joint ventures in Eastern Europe will be
impossible."'28 Likewise, Iancu Spigler commented in 1975 that
"[p]olitical, economic, and ideological constrictions prevent East
European Governments from agreeing to direct Western investment as
fully-owned Western business enterprises. '29
Poland has tempered ideology with the pragmatic realization that
foreign capital is needed for Poland's economic development. Foreign
equity participation is rationalized as serving societal goals of increas-
ing the level of technology, the quality of management skills, and the
supply of consumer goods.30
This Polish concept of ownership diverges from that of market
economies because Poles view ownership rights as residing with the
state, not the investor. Only the state may grant limited equity inter-
ests to foreign investors as part of its plan for the development of the
domestic economy. Nevertheless, economic cooperation between
Western investors and East European nations has proved mutually
beneficial. Despite ideological differences, their cooperative activities
have developed through the years in conformity with their respective
goals.
II. ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST: FORM AND MOTIVATION
Polish law, as discussed in Section I, has permitted foreign equity
investment since the 1920s. Considerable foreign investment took
place in those early years. Poland, however, became disenchanted
21 HANDEL ZAGRANIczNY, No. 2 1976, at 17-18; Sadowska, Problemy dzialalnosciprzed-
siebiorstw miedzynarodowych w gospodarce socjalistycznej, 20 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No.
9 1972, at 320.
27. Burzynski, Bezposrednia dzialalnosc gospodarcza w PoIsce zagranicznych osob
prawnych i fizycznych (I), 32 PRZEGLAD USTAWODAWSTWA GOSPODARCZEGO, No. 6
1979, at 198; Chyla, Aspekty prawne powolywania przedstawicielstw firm obcych w Poisce
podejmujacych kooperacje z polskimi organizacjami przemyslowymi i handlowymi, 23 HAN-
DEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 3 1978, at 45.
28. R. KRETSCHMAR & R. FOOR, THE POTENTIAL FOR JOINT VENTURE IN EASTERN
EUROPE 3 (1972).
29. I. SPIGLER, DiREcr WESTERN INVESTMENT IN EAST EUROPE 69 (1975); see also
Gordon, The Developing Law of Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281,
290-01 (1974).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 44-53 (analysis of parties' motivations for enter-
ing into cooperation agreements and joint ventures).
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with foreign capital in the period between World War I and World
War 11.31 Foreign corporations transferred the majority of their prof-
its abroad, leaving no funds for the rebuilding of the Polish economy
after the wars. 32 The initial reluctance of the socialist regime to per-
mit foreign investment is thought to have stemmed from this experi-
ence.33 By the 1970s, however, hard currency 34 shortages and high
demand for technology prompted the government to encourage for-
eign operations on Polish soil.
Cooperation between a foreign investor and a socialist host nation
can take various forms, ranging from the licensing of technology to
joint ventures. This section will consider the cooperative options
available to East European nations and Western investors in structur-
ing transactions. It will also explore parties' motivations for engaging
in cooperative arrangements and reasons why each may favor joint
venture-direct involvement by the investor in the socialist economy.
A. LEVELS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Commentators have not agreed on a consistent method for ana-
lyzing the myriad economic relationships between Western investors
and their East European partners. One useful framework classifies
agreements into four levels: short-term, arms-length relationships;
longer-term agreements; joint ventures; and wholly foreign-owned
ventures. 35
"Level I" cooperation consists of basic contractual-type arrange-
ments. These include trade, licensing of technology, and sale of turn-
key facilities.36 Goods and services are supplied for cash or unrelated
products. At this level of agreement each party retains complete
autonomy over its part of the transaction and deals strictly on an
arms-length basis with its partner.
"Level II" arrangements span a wide variety of agreements in
which payment for goods, services, licenses, or technology is linked to
the production, marketing, or sale of those products.37 Included in
31. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 10, at 46.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. Hard currency is currency that is freely exchangeable in world markets and has a
comparatively stable value, for example, the dollar or the pound. W. DAVIS, THE LAN-
GUAGE OF MONEY 114-15 (1973). Soft currency can be defined as "the funds of a country
that are controlled by exchange procedures, thereby having limited convertibility into gold
and other currencies." J. ROSENBERG, DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCE 465
(1982).
35. See, eg., C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN
EUROPE: A THREE COUNTRY COMPARISON 9-16 (1973) (delineating the first three
relationships).




this category are licensing contracts with payment in products or com-
ponents; supply of turnkey plants in exchange for a portion of the pro-
duction; co-production agreements with different parties supplying
components, technology, and management skills; and the subcontract-
ing of production to East European firms in exchange for the manufac-
turer's free use of design, technology, and know-how involved in
production.38 Under these arrangements each party retains control
over its part of the bargain. Returns, however, are linked to the over-
all success of the enterprise.39
"Level III" cooperation consists of joint ventures. In a joint ven-
ture, each party owns a share of equity in an independent organiza-
tion,4° and the parties share ownership, control, and decision-making
responsibility for the enterprise.
"Level IV" arrangements are 100% foreign-owned ventures oper-
ating on East European soil. In such a venture, all decision-making
power resides with the foreign investor.
Each level of industrial cooperation involves an increasing degree
of interdependence among the parties, the venture, and its returns.41
The arrangements also conflict with socialist ideology to varying
degrees. Level I agreements, or contractual forms of cooperation,
resemble trade agreements that can be easily assimilated into socialist
ideology. Level II agreements, which require a certain degree of
dependence between the partners, are also favored by the East Europe-
ans. The Soviet Union, for example, defines Level II agreements as
the ideological limit of Western cooperation with Soviet economic
entities.42 Other nations, including Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania,
Poland, and Bulgaria43 are experimenting with Level III and Level IV
agreements, the joint venture and the wholly foreign-owned enterprise.
These levels of interdependence clearly threaten communist ideology
38. Id. For a more complete description of common forms of cooperative arrange-
ments, see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Analytical Report on Indus-
trial Co-operation Among ECE Countries 7-14, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/844/Rev. 1 (1973); F.
LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY, INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 23-
40 (1979).
39. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 10.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 11-16.
42. Dr. Dzherman Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science
and Technology, stated that Soviet law would not evolve to permit Western firms to hold
an equity interest in joint ventures. He stated that the benefits of ownership could largely
be achieved through negotiation of more traditional cooperative arrangements, such as
leasing capital and technology, supply of turnkey plants, and joint research and develop-
ment efforts. Gvishianfr Prospects and Limits in Cooperation Deals, 8 Bus. E. EUR. 89
(1979).
43. For further discussion of these nations' approaches toward joint ventures, see infra
text accompanying notes 147-99.
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because they entail foreign ownership of productive assets otherwise
subject exclusively to state ownership.
The socialist nations have proceeded through the various levels of
economic interdependence with the goal of maximizing economic ben-
efits. It is, therefore, instructive to examine the motivations for devel-
oping and sustaining such close economic ties.
B. THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION
Cooperative arrangements with East European countries offer the
foreign investor several potential advantages: access to markets, low-
cost production, stable social and economic relations, stable labor con-
ditions, financial leverage, and new technology. 44
The benefit of access to new markets is a significant impetus for
business interest in cooperation agreements. 45 The East European
market has remained largely untapped by Western firms. Cooperative
agreements offer the opportunity to gain a market share in one coun-
try and to use that foothold to gain a share across the entire region.
Close economic relationships among COMECON states may facilitate
access to these markets, provide preferential tariff treatment for the
products of East European joint ventures, and result in favorable for-
eign currency conversion rights granted to companies that market
joint venture products.46
Cooperation agreements also allow Western firms to benefit from
the availability of raw materials and resources, low-cost inputs includ-
ing labor and production facilities, and the reduced cost of transporta-
tion involved in product distribution. Longer-term cooperation
arrangements, such as co-production and joint ventures, allow firms to
take advantage of stable social and economic conditions for the dura-
tion of the agreement. The passivity of the East European workforce
is another factor. The workers are generally well-trained, their wages
are low, and they are indisposed to the frequent walkouts over pay and
conditions that occur in Western countries.47
An especially attractive area of cooperation for Western firms is
the supply of technology. Cooperation arrangements providing that
the Western firm will supply technology for co-production or joint
44. See generally R. KRETSCHMAR & R. FOOR, supra note 28, at 16-17; F. LEVCIK & J.
STANKOVSKY, supra note 38, at 41-54; M. SCHNITZER, U.S. BUSINESS INVOLVEMENT IN
EASTERN EUROPE 29-32 (1980); Avoiding Confusion Over JV Objectives, Bus. E. EUR. 249
(1980); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supra note 38, at 14-17; Jung &
Sawicka, Kooperacja przemyslowa w oczach zachodnich partnerow, 19 HANDEL ZAGRAN-
ICZNY, No. 12 1974, at 527.
45. See Joint Ventures: Rush or Wait?, 8 Bus. E. EUR. 332 (1979).
46. See C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 19; R. KRETSCHMAR &
R. FOOR, supra note 28, at 16.
47. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 20.
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ventures permit the Western firm to capitalize on past research and
development expenditure without additional cash commitment. The
East European party receiving the technology, moreover, may be
required to share the cost of improvements that occur while using the
new technology. 48
East European partners also expect significant benefits from joint
East-West agreements. Polish and Western writers focus on the fol-
lowing benefits: access to new technology, development of managerial
skills, access to Western markets, new sources for industrial compo-
nents and supplies, increased supply of goods, new sources of financ-
ing, and inflow of hard currency.49
For Poland, the primary benefits of industrial cooperation with
the West are new technology, enhanced management skills, and
increased supply of goods for internal consumption. In 1974, the Dep-
uty Minister of Trade declared that Poland's main interests in cooper-
ation arrangements are development of the nation's technological and
organizational skills and optimization of the country's productive
potential.50 This interest in technology and management, echoed by
many Polish commentators,5' has been cited as a significant factor
motivating East European nations to accept the concept of joint ven-
tures.5 2 An equity interest gives an investor an incentive to provide
the ultra-modern technology and production methods necessary to
ensure the profitability of the enterprise.
Soviet bloc nations gain more than technological and managerial
skill from cooperative ventures. Many arrangements involve the pro-
duction of goods in the East European country for sale in the West.
Such agreements open new outlets for East European products. Con-
tracts may also stipulate that the investor will supply needed parts and
equipment for production, thus opening new sources of supply for
industrial inputs. Some of the finished products may also be chan-
48. Western companies may also benefit from technology developed by East European
enterprises. Kiser, Tapping Eastern Bloc Technology, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1982,
at 85.
49. See generally C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 19-20.
50. Interview with Stanislaw Dlugosz, Deputy Minister of Trade, Wektory, (May,
1973), quoted in Wierolowski, Kooperacja prezemyslowa z zagranica w polityce
umiedzynarodowienia procesow produkcynych w Polsce, 19 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No.
8/9 1974, at 329.
51. Bukowski, supra note 26, at 16; Plowiec, Niektore problemy tworzenia przedsiebi-
orstw z udzialem partnerow z krajow zachodu, 18 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 12 1973, at
437; Rybak, Joint ventures-wspolne przedsiewziecia i spolne ryzyko, 18 HANDEL ZAGRAN-
IcZNY, No. 10 1973, at 328; Zagorski, supra note 26, at 19; F. LEVCIK & J. STANKOVSKY,
supra note 38, at 48-53.
52. Rybak, supra note 51, at 328; R. KRETSCHMAR & R. FOOR, supra note 28, at 15-
16; C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 17-19; Starr, The Potential for
Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 10 INT'L LAw. 35 (1976).
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neled to the East European market, increasing the supply of goods to
consumers as well as easing production backlogs.
Cooperation agreements provide two major financial advantages
for the socialist partner. They provide new forms of industrial financ-
ing and offer relief from chronic balance-of-trade pressures. Western
firms engaging in cooperation ventures may contribute technology,
know-how, designs, and product specifications to the European part-
ner in exchange for a portion of the goods produced. Western compa-
nies may also contribute hard currency for the development of joint
facilities and equipment. Such arrangements for payment in kind in
the future enable the East European partner to maximize the use of
internal resources and save hard currency. Furthermore, sales of
products in Western markets promise a flow of hard currency during
the course of the venture.
Cooperation ventures clearly benefit both Eastern and Western
partners. As experience with the various contractual forms broadens,
each side becomes more willing to enter into joint ventures. Western
firms want the ownership and control rights flowing from the equity
position. Socialist nations, on the other hand, believe that equity will
enhance the Western party's long-term commitment to the enterprise
and ensure a continual supply of the newest technology and manage-
ment systems.53 Poland, along with many of its East European neigh-
bors, has progressed beyond Level I cooperation to allow foreign
equity holdings. Polish efforts, based on a fifty-year history of foreign-
equity regulation, have gone beyond the mere authorization of foreign
equity in Polish joint ventures. Current regulations permit 100% for-
eign-owned companies to operate in Poland, and allow foreign equity
share in Polish joint ventures to exceed 50%. Section III explores the
scope of these regulations after providing an overview of the historical
development of Polish foreign investment legislation.
III. POLISH FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Yugoslavia, Hungary,
and Romania enacted legislation permitting joint ventures, business-
men and academics engaged in considerable discussion regarding the
possibility of allowing joint ventures in Poland. 54 A consensus
emerged that mixed companies would be treated as Polish corpora-
tions and that each proposal for foreign investment would be consid-
53. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 17.
54. Horbaczewski, Profitable Coexistence: The Legal Foundation for Joint Enterprise
with U.S. Participation in Poland, 31 Bus. LAw. 433,452-54 (1975); Jung & Sawicki, Spolki
mieszane-cel i rzeczywistosc, 20 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 11 1975, at 33; Tabaczyn-
ski, Rozwoj kooperacji przemyslowej z krajami zachodu-wazne zadania najblizszej piecio-
latki, 20 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 11 1975.
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ered separately by the appropriate ministries5 5 This approach,
however, did not allay the concerns of Western companies, who
wanted Poland to commit itself to a clear position on the status of
foreign investment and to set out this position in the form of general
rules.
Between 1976 and 1982, the Sejm (legislature) and the ministries
enacted regulations defining the permissible scope of foreign invest-
ment in Poland. Companies with foreign equity participation were
divided into three groups: 100% foreign-owned ("Polonia") 56 compa-
nies, small business ventures without limitations on foreign participa-
tion, and joint ventures in which foreign participation was limited to
49% of total equity. According to the first set of regulations, which
the Council of Ministers issued in 1976, 57 foreign companies managed
from or residing abroad, and "Polonia" organizations formed and
operated abroad, could establish wholly-owned ventures in fields such
as crafts, domestic trade, food service and hospitality.58 Administra-
tive organs 59 licensed these operations, issuing permits valid for a max-
imum of ten years.60 Polish administrative authorities, however,
enjoyed significant discretion to deny these licenses.61 Investors could
withdraw profits up to an amount representing 9% of the hard cur-
rency invested, subject to a maximum of 50% of corporate net
income.62 The Ministry of Finance relaxed the limit for firms generat-
ing more than 50% of their sales in hard currency. 63
Two orders from the Minister of Finance in 1976 established
55. FOREIGN TRADE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (WARSAW), EAsT-WEST ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (1973), cited in S. PALIWODA, JOINT EAST-WEST MARKETING AND PRODUC-
TION VENTURES 143 (1981); M. ScHNriaER, supra note 44, at 70; Burzynski, Regulacja
prawna dzialalnoscigospodarczej cudzoziemcow, 28 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 5 1983, at
26; Burzynski, Bezposrednia dzialalnoic gospodarcza w Poisce zagranicznych osob prawnych
ifizycznych (II), 32 PRZEGLAD USTAWODAWSTWA GOSPODARCZEGO, No. 7 1979, at 197-
98; Sadowska, supra note 26, at 6.
56. "Polonia" is a Polish term describing expatriates who retain close emotional and
social ties to their homeland. One of the objectives of the 1976 regulations was to
encourage these individuals to return and invest their capital in Poland. Although later
regulations dropped the requirement of "Polonia" status for investors in wholly foreign-
owned enterprises, the term "Polonia" companies has persisted and will be used in this
paper to refer to wholly-owned foreign companies operating in Poland.
57. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 14 May 1976, Dz. U. No. 19, it. 123
(1976).
58. Id. at § 1. The permissible fields of investment were expanded in 1978 to include
all other service and manufacturing operations. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1
Dec. 1978, DzU. No. 31, it. 135, § 1(1) (1978).
59. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 14 May 1976, D7_ U. No. 19, it. 123, § 3
(1976).
60. Id.
61. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 10, at 52.
62. Order of the Minister of Finance of 26 May 1976, M.P. No. 25, it. 109, § 6 (1976).
63. Id.
1985]
76 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
guidelines for the operation of "mixed capital companies" 64 (joint ven-
tures). These orders were not premised on any explicit decree or reso-
lution validating joint venture investment. The disregard of these
provisions by businessmen prompted the government, in 1979, to
replace the orders with Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers, 65
which carefully detailed the status of, and rules applicable to, joint
ventures. Under Decree No. 24, the foreign equity share could not
exceed 49%,66 and company operations were limited to areas under
regional administration. 67 Because only small and medium companies
operate under regional supervision, the regulations removed joint ven-
tures from the scope and requirements of the economic plan. The
Decree also specified licensing procedures,68 accounting standards, 69
and various operating requirements such as currency regulations and
the right to contract with state agencies. 70 Foreign investors were per-
mitted to repatriate a proportionate share of net proceeds, subject to
the company's supply of hard currency, to fund the transaction. 71
A two-tiered investment policy prevailed in Poland by the 1980s.
One set of regulations applied to wholly-owned Polonia companies,
and another to joint Western-Polish enterprises. The Law of 6 July
1982 revised investment regulations again.72 This legislation, applica-
ble both to Polonia companies and newly-authorized "small business
ventures," expanded the scope of foreign participation in the Polish
economy. Foreign parties are now permitted to invest in small manu-
facturing, shipping and trade, and export production industries, either
as wholly-owned companies or as joint ventures with an unlimited for-
eign share of equity.73 Companies may obtain twenty-year operating
permits74 and remit 10% of initial capital, subject to a limit of 50%
net hard-currency exports.75 Except for these limitations, companies
can conclude agreements, sell products, lease property for corporate
operations, 76 and operate freely within the economy.
64. Id. at it. 109, § 6 and it. 110.
65. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36 (1979).
66. Id. at § 3(1).
67. Id. at § 2.
68. Id. at § 5(2).
69. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, § 12 (1979).
70. Annex to Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it.
36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Annex].
71. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 2
(1979).
72. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146 (1982).
73. Id. at §§ 2, 14.
74. Id. at § 16.
75. Id. at § 33.
76. Id. at §§ 24, 25, 38.
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Polish scholars have criticized the 1982 provisions.77 They argue
that the relationship between the 1982. provisions regulating small
businesses and the 1979 regulations concerning joint ventures has not
been clearly established. 78 The 1982 law neither defines "small busi-
ness" nor provides criteria for determining the proper scope of such
investments. Administrators could conclude that a "small business" is
any economic activity outside major governmental undertakings. This
definition would be unworkable, however, because the 1982 statute
would collide with 1979 regulations. The failure to define "small busi-
ness" leaves two questions unanswered. First, it is unclear when a
small business becomes large enough to qualify as a joint venture. Sec-
ond, it is unclear whether the government's ability to require a mini-
mum of 51% Polish equity holding in small business ventures79
qualifies them as joint ventures, subjecting them to the less favorable
1979 provisions. Despite these areas of uncertainty, it is clear that
what began in the 1970s as a case-by-case approach to evaluating
investment proposals has evolved into a normative structure with
explicit provisions assuring investors of the status of operations in
Poland. Polish scholars have welcomed this approach as a pragmatic
attempt to encourage the flow of foreign capital into the Polish
economy. 80
The rest of this section analyzes the Polish foreign investment
regulations from the perspective of a Western investor who seeks con-
trol over market participation, management, organization and mobil-
ity of capital, operations, transfer of ownership, or liquidation. This
section also compares the rights of investors in Western economies
with the rights of foreign investors in Polonia companies, small busi-
ness ventures, and joint ventures.
A. FORMATION OF THE ENTERPRISE
Every state requires some form of registration for companies
operating within its boundaries. These requirements can range from
merely filing articles of incorporation to acquiring a permit to operate
in a limited territory. In market economies, although a firm may be
required to comply with general registration provisions, decisions con-
cerning expansion, employment, types of products manufactured, and
similar issues remain fully within the investor's discretion. The Polish
economy is based on different principles. Foreign investors do not
77. See, e.g., Wisniewski, Tworzenieprzedsiebiorstw, 28 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 5
(1983).
78. Id. There are other regulations which provide examples of small businesses but
likewise offer no general standards. Id
79. See infra text accompanying notes 107-09.
80. See, eg., Burzynski, Regulacja prawna dzialanosci, supra note 55, at 27.
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enjoy a right to operate in Poland. Rather, they are invited to apply
to administrative bodies for permission to conduct limited economic
activity in a specified territory. Corporate activities that stray outside
the limits specified in the permit are not allowed. Changes in products
marketed, employment, location, and number of offices established
require further ministerial approval.
In market economies, ownership establishes the right to create
corporations and to deploy capital at will, subject only to minimal reg-
ulatory requirements. However, countries with market economies are
with increasing frequency regulating investment and requiring compa-
nies to act responsibly within the community. Many now require
advance notice of plant closings, contributions to social welfare funds,
and severance payments to dismissed workers. The rights of investors
to implement corporate strategies remain secondary to the state's
interest in providing an orderly functioning economy.
Poland regards investment as a state-controlled right. This right
can be extended to foreign investors who present proposals comple-
mentary to the state's plans for economic development. Investment
rights, therefore, reside with the state. They are not a concomitant of
ownership. Thus, each time a firm wishes to open a new manufactur-
ing or distribution outlet in Poland, the firm must seek a new permit. 81
A firm wishing to expand operations in order to encompass a larger
number of products, employ more workers, or transfer operations to a
different location, may find its actions restricted by the state. The
question is whether, and to what extent, such restriction on the organi-
zation and mobility of capital negates the ownership interests that
Westerners associate with equity position.
Poland and the other planned economies have chosen to exercise
a greater degree of control over both domestic and foreign concerns
than do market economies. That investors are permitted to invest in
Poland at all and redeploy assets subject to regulations reflects basic
recognition of these attributes of ownership. Western businessmen
may prefer greater economic certainty and flexibility with respect to
such decisions, but companies cannot realistically argue that a state's
exercise of economic control necessarily denies basic ownership rights.
Before establishing wholly-owned companies or small business
ventures, investors must apply for a permit with the voivodship
(regional administrative body) in the district in which the company
will be located. If investors plan to propose import and export activi-
ties, they must also apply with the Minister of Foreign Trade.82 The
application is subject to a deposit of 800,000 to four-million zloty




(approximately $5,000 to $25,000), depending on the type of business
involved.8 3 Investors must indicate the type of activity contemplated,
the location of the business, the number of employees, the form of
financing, and the name of the appointed legal representative. Inves-
tors must attach a copy of the company's by-laws.8 4 The permit issued
will indicate the maximum number of persons that may be
employed, 85 as well as the duration of the venture. Permits may be
issued for twenty years and may be renewed in appropriate
circumstances.8 6
Regulations governing joint ventures require the state enterprise
or cooperative involved to submit an application for permission to
conduct a joint venture in Poland. The application must be approved
by the Chairman of the Committee on Domestic Markets, the Chair-
man of the State Planning Committee, the Minister of Finance, and
the Minister overseeing the state enterprise or cooperative involved in
the venture.87 Foreign investors must agree to install the newest avail-
able technology in the operations. 88 Any equipment contributed by
the foreign party must be valued by Polish experts in zloty. 89 The
resulting permit may be issued for a maximum of fifteen years and is
renewable if circumstances warrant.90
B. CORPORATE FORM
Investors in Western economies face a variety of choices when
planning a venture. An individual or enterprise has broad latitude to
select an investment partner, subject to antitrust limitations, and to
decide whether the undertaking will be a sole proprietorship, a part-
nership, or a corporation.
Poland sets numerous limitations on the parties it permits to par-
ticipate in its economy. This is particularly true regarding domestic
companies authorized to form joint ventures. Polonia companies and
small business ventures may be formed by foreign nationals residing in
Poland who have obtained a permanent residence permit, by foreign
enterprises managed from abroad, or by persons residing abroad.91
Polish participants in small business ventures may be state entities and
83. Id. at § 15.
84. Id. at § 9.
85. Id.
86. Id. at § 16.
87. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 5
(1979).
88. Annex, supra note 70, at art. I, § 3.
89. Id. at art. IV, § 16.
90. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 4
(1979).
91. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146, § 1(1) (1982).
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cooperatives involved in small manufacture, socialized units engaged
in economic activity, unions of small producers, companies and indi-
viduals conducting small businesses in Poland, or other economic
organizations in economic activity with foreign parties.92 Polonia
companies and small business ventures are not required to have mini-
mum capitalization and are not restricted with regard to economic
form. The law expressly allows investors to choose any legal form
permissible in Poland,93 merely requiring them to operate in accord-
ance with civil and commercial codes.94
Joint ventures with foreign and Polish equity participation are
restricted as to participants and corporate form. Foreign participation
may include enterprises and persons managed from or residing abroad
that have legal capacity to engage in such transactions. 95 Polish par-
ticipation is limited to socialist entities and cooperatives 96 and admin-
istrative bodies97 such as voivodships. The minimum level of
capitalization for a joint venture is five-million zloty (approximately
$30,000).98 Additionally, the firm must assume the form of a limited
liability company. 99 These regulations enable Poland to maintain joint
venture activity at manageable levels with participation by socialist
enterprises.
By limiting an investor's choice of partners and corporate form,
Poland substantially restricts an investor's freedom to structure trans-
actions. Polish statutes may therefore be viewed as a usurpation of
ownership rights in that they limit an owner's freedom to invest capi-
tal to the extent and in the form he desires. Although these restric-
tions are greater than the restrictions imposed in market economies,
foreign investors in Poland retain significant freedom.
92. Id.
93. There are four types of companies permitted in Poland: civil law partnerships,
commercial partnerships, limited liability companies, and joint stock companies. For a
discussion of some of the implications of various organizational forms, see Burzynski &
Juergensmeyer, Poland's New Foreign Investment Regulations: An Added Dimension to
East-West Industrial Co-operation, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 23-26 (1981).
94. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz" U. No. 19, it. 146 (1982).
95. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 1(4)
(superceding Order of the Minister of Finance of 26 May 1976, M.P. No. 25, it. 109, § 1
(1976)).
96. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 1(4)
(1976).
97. Law of 30 Dec. 1981, Dz U No. 24, it. 122, §§ 13, 14 (1981).
98. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, D7_ U. No. 16, it. 97, § 5(1)
(1979).




C. SCOPE OF AcTIvITY
In market economies, investors determine not only the legal form
of the undertaking but the type of markets in which the enterprise will
compete. This freedom is not available in Poland. The Constitution
requires that socialized units of production conduct economic activity
under the directives of the economic plan."0 Foreign investors wish-
ing to enter this strictly controlled market require the express consent
of the government.
Foreign investment in Poland is permitted in limited segments of
the economy. The 1976 legislation establishing Polonia companies
restricted their activity to crafts, domestic trade, food services, hospi-
tality and other services. 10 1 In 1978, the Council of Ministers
expanded this list to include all manufacturing and service activi-
ties.102 The 1982 legislation allows Polonia companies and small busi-
ness ventures to engage in small manufacture, trade in services and
goods, and import-export operations. 1°3 Joint ventures, however, are
permitted only in activities that are under regional administration and
activities in which cooperatives participate. 1°4 Because regional
administrative bodies oversee local production that is not incorporated
in the economic plan, this restriction ensures that foreign investments
are limited in nature. Furthermore, regulations limit joint ventures to
manufacturing activities; they cannot engage in trade of goods or
services. 105
The Polish restrictions on spheres of investment reduce the scope
of available investment benefits, but the restrictions preserve, within
limits, an owner's right to choose the direction of the investment.
Some type of restriction on investment activity is unavoidable in a cen-
trally planned economy. Poland has incorporated foreign companies
into the mainstream of economic activity, but has restricted the fields
of investment to activities outside the economic plan.
D. MANAGEMENT
The Western investor who seeks to control his investment may
want the power to make operating and financial decisions, to choose a
workforce, to invest the company's capital, and to prepare corporate
100. Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, supra note 7, at art. XI.
101. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 14 May 1976, DZ U. No. 19, it. 123, § 1
(1976).
102. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 1 Dec. 1978, Dz. U. No. 31, it. 135, § 1(1)
(1978).
103. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146, § 2 (1982).
104. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 2
(1979).
105. Annex, supra note 70, art. I, § 2.
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strategy. If ownership of a given percentage of shares translates into a
proportionate voice on the board of directors, a limitation on foreign
ownership to 49% restricts the investor's control over his capital.
The Polish Commercial Code recognizes the validity of share-
holder agreements that establish specific voting and profit distribution
rights. 10 6 In the absence of such an agreement, shareholder control
will be proportionate to capital contributions. Because the Commer-
cial Code leaves control and distribution issues open to negotiation,
however, statutory limitations on the percentage of foreign equity
holdings do not necessarily relegate foreign investors to minority con-
trol status.
The 1982 regulations governing Polonia companies and small
business ventures permit unlimited shares of foreign equity. Polonia
companies are by definition 100% wholly-owned foreign investments.
The Polish administrative body may require Polish equity in small
business ventures to exceed 50%.107 This minimum equity require-
ment was apparently enacted in order to limit operations that had the
potential to affect sectors of the economy covered by the national eco-
nomic plan. Polish law further requires a wholly-owned or majority-
owned foreign firm to name a Polish citizen or entity as its legal repre-
sentative in Poland. 10 8 This representative is empowered to transact
business during the investor's absence from the country. In all other
respects, 0 9 control issues are left to agreement among the investors.
Joint ventures established pursuant to the 1979 regulations face
more substantial restrictions on control. First, foreign equity partici-
pation may not exceed 49%. 110 The fact that investors can apportion
control without regard to the restriction does not signal lack of Polish
control. In addition to equity limits, regulations require that the for-
eign hard currency contribution represent at least half of the for-
eigner's investment in the venture. The minimum investment is four
shares valued at 250,000 zloty (approximately $1,500) each."' The
law also requires that both the general manager and the bookkeeper be
Polish citizens. 1 2 The foreign investor, however, is permitted to over-
see financial operations and to participate in the supervisory or audit
106. THE COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 191, 236, cited in Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra
note 93, at 39 n.74.
107. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146, § 14 (1982).
108. Id. at § 8.
109. Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 93, at 22.
110. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 3(1)
(1979).
111. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, §§ 5, 6
(1979).




Investors' control interests are better protected in Polonia compa-
nies and small business ventures. Regulations guarantee foreign inves-
tors a voice in the financing and auditing of joint ventures. Investors
can also seek greater participation in decisions in areas such as quality
control, production, and employment. Joint ventures are, however,
subject to legal restrictions on foreign equity participation, and stat-
utes require that Polish citizens control management. Foreign owner-
ship rights are, therefore, relegated to minority status. Joint venture
agreements can give investors additional control rights, but socialist
entities empowered to engage in such ventures may withhold their
assent.
E. OPERATIONS
The ability to control an investment on a direct and continuing
basis is another significant attribute of ownership. Western firms are
required to comply with various regulatory standards, such as
accounting procedures, occupational safety, and product safety stan-
dards. They remain free to operate in domestic markets and to with-
draw profits from the corporation in the form of salary and dividends.
Poland treats foreign companies and state enterprises equally. From
the perspective of Western firms, however, this treatment is considera-
bly more intrusive than the treatment they receive from Western
governments.
1. Foreign-Owned Firms
Foreign companies are given broad latitude in conducting busi-
ness in Poland. The principal restriction concerns the withdrawal of
profits from the venture. The lack of convertibility of local currency
necessitates that the government guarantee foreign exchange rights for
investors remitting funds abroad. These rights, however, are restricted
so that only a fraction of the profits can actually be received in con-
vertible currency.
Foreign-owned firms generally enjoy equal footing with state
owned companies in operating matters. They may conclude contracts
with state industries," 4 sell imported goods and services through
appropriate agencies,115 obtain credit from Polish banks," 6 and lease
real property. 117 Foreign companies are also subject to the internal
113. Annex, supra note 70, at art. II, § 9.
114. Id. at § 24.
115. Id. at § 25.
116. Id. at § 32.
117. Id. at § 38.
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regulations applicable to domestic companies. These include regula-
tions concerning labor and social conditions, product pricing, and the
placement of import-export orders through the foreign trade
enterprises. 118
Firms established pursuant to the 1982 legislation enjoy a three-
year tax holiday' 19 and are thereafter subject to general tax provisions
applicable to foreign investors. The maximum tax which can be
assessed on these companies is 50%.120 Foreign investors are permit-
ted to remit annually 10% of initial hard currency invested, as long as
the remittance does not exceed 50% of hard currency exports or 50%
of net corporate income.121
2. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures involving Polish and foreign participation also
enjoy broad operating rights under the regulatory framework. Joint
ventures may conclude co-production agreements with state enter-
prises, 122 purchase supplies and component parts on internal mar-
kets, 123 invite competitive bids for delivery of intermediate goods from
Polish and foreign suppliers, 24 and negotiate consignment agreements
with domestic and foreign companies.1 25 Corporate accounts must be
maintained in zloty,126 although the venture may engage in transac-
tions with socialist entities in either zloty or convertible currency.' 27
Joint venture operations are covered by the economic plan.128 Compa-
nies may apply for exemption from most planning requirements, how-
ever, including growth rates, limitations on wage funds, and limits on
assets and general inventories. 29
Joint ventures are subject to financial restrictions pursuant to reg-
ulations issued by the Minister of Finance in 1979. Firms must invest
25% of their annual gross profit 130 into a "risk fund." This fund is
established to cover operating losses and to satisfy creditors in the
118. See generally Inter-Polcom, supra note 14.
119. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146, § 27 (1982).
120. Id. at §§ 26-30.
121. Id. at § 33(1).
122. Annex, supra note 70, at art. XI, § 38.
123. Id. at art. IX, § 32.
124. Id. at § 33.
125. Id. at § 34.
126. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, § 34 (1979).
127. Annex, supra note 70, at art. III, § 12.
128. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 6
(1979).
129. Annex, supra note 70, at art. X, § 35.
130. The initial contribution is 20% of first year gross profits. Order of the Minister of
Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, § 12 (1979). Gross profits are defined as
revenue less operating expenses, prior to distribution to required joint venture funds.
Annex, supra note 70, at art. VI, § 22.
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event of default.131 This fund must maintain a balance of 10% of the
total joint venture capital. 132 The company must also contribute 20%
of its gross profit to a "reserve fund."' 133 The fund is used to cover
losses exceeding the risk fund, finance investment expenditures, pro-
vide working capital, and cover social welfare liabilities chargeable
against corporate resources.' 34
Joint ventures are subject to the same tax liabilities applicable to
socialist entities. These include turnover tax, payroll tax, income tax,
and urban property tax. 35 From the joint venture's convertible cur-
rency account, the foreign investor is guaranteed a proportionate share
of profits for deposit or remittance abroad. 36 The amount actually
distributed is limited, however, to the company's convertible currency
reserves and, in the event of shortfall in the account, to resources
secured in accordance with currency exchange regulations. 37
Polish regulations, therefore, set foreign companies on equal foot-
ing with their socialist counterparts regarding ownershp interests.
Limits on profit remittance, however, restrict firms which wish to
withdraw their share of profits annually. Of course, guaranteed remit-
tance of all domestic and hard currency earnings is not a realistic
expectation for companies operating in soft currency countries. Firms
must also impute value to the ability to enter the East European mar-
ket and to transact business in local currency. Profits can be with-
drawn to the extent that the investment generates hard currency
reserves. Investors are, in this respect, able to realize benefits com-
mensurate with corporate performance. Net export earnings deter-
mine the maximum remittable balance. This leaves the remainder
available for reinvestment in the enterprise or for other use within the
country.
F. TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP AND LIQUIDATION
The value of an investment is reflected in the returns generated
during its operation and in the accrual of accounts and goodwill. The
accrual is realized upon the sale or liquidation of the assets. An inves-
tor must, therefore, be able to transfer his interest and withdraw the
131. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, § 12 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 13.
134. Id.
135. See Weralski, The New Policies and Legislation Concerning Joint Ventures in
Poland, 20 EUR. TAX'N 99, 103-04 (1980).
136. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U No. 16, it. 97, §§ 19, 20
(1979).
137. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 2
(1979); see also id. at § 20.
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proceeds in convertible currency in order to enjoy the value of the
investment.
Poland's approach to transfer and liquidation of investments gen-
erally mirrors its treatment of profit remittance. That is, foreign inves-
tors are entitled to recoup their investments in convertible currency to
the extent of the venture's hard currency earnings or the reserves gen-
erated upon sale or liquidation.
Foreign owners of Polonia companies and small business ventures
may sell their interests to a buyer who has obtained a permit to buy
the operation. The purchaser must deposit the purchase price in con-
vertible currency in a Polish bank.138 The corporate bylaws, in con-
junction with Poland's civil and commercial codes, govern
liquidation. 139 When a small business is dissolved, the Polish partner
has priority in purchasing the assets of the liquidated company. 140
In contrast, joint venture rights are deemed personal and not
transferable without the consent of all of the parties to the transac-
tion.141 The transfer is also subject to the Polish partner's right of
first refusal. 142 If the sale price is paid in convertible currency to the
foreign partner, the full amount can be remitted.143 If the business is
liquidated, the foreign party is entitled to a proportionate share of the
net proceeds. Part of the proceeds may be remitted without a separate
foreign currency permit. 144 Foreign currency permits are guaranteed
to the extent of the corporation's hard currency resources. Thereafter,
the permits are subject to rights granted by the ministry that licensed
the venture, although the amount must be within the scope of that
ministry's overall currency exchange limitation.1 45
G. SUMMARY
The Polish investment regulations reflect a pragmatic approach to
controlling capital investment. Following an integrated model of capi-
tal investment, Poland permits wholly foreign-owned companies and
joint ventures to operate on equal terms with socialist entities in nego-
tiating contracts, procuring supplies, and selling products on the
domestic market. Foreign investment is permitted only in areas that
are outside the economic plan and under regional administration. The
138. Law of 6 July 1982, Dz U. No. 19, it. 146, § 34 (1982).
139. Id. at § 40.
140. Id. at § 41.
141. Decree No. 24 of the Council of Ministers of 7 Feb. 1979, M.P. No. 4, it. 36, § 3(2)
(1979).
142. Order of the Minister of Finance of 18 June 1979, Dz U. No. 16, it. 97, § 26 (1979).
143. Annex, supra note 70, at art. VIII; see also id. at § 23.





removal of foreign investment from the economic plan ensures against
capitalist influence in key state industries.1 46 In addition, foreign firms
are restricted from expanding or diversifying operations at will, and
from remitting an unlimited share of profits in convertible currencies.
Poland imposes some restrictions on each of the six aspects of
ownership that are considered in this section. Section IV shows that
these restrictions are less severe than the restrictions that Poland's
East European neighbors impose. Section V shows that restrictions in
Poland have not discouraged foreign investors from forming highly
profitable wholly-owned operations there.
IV. OTHER EAST EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGULATION
Other East European nations restrict foreign ownership more
severely than Poland. Yugoslavia permits domestic enterprises to
enter into contractual joint ventures with investors. Romania has cre-
ated a financial enclave in which joint companies operate. Hungary
has integrated joint ventures into its economy. Bulgaria has embraced
a "double appraisal" system of regulation. The Soviet Union has
refused to permit any foreign equity holding in domestic enterprises.
This section outlines the various East European models of joint ven-
tures and compares these with the Polish foreign investment system.
A. YUGOSLAVIA
In Yugoslavia, society, rather than the state, owns the means of
production, while workers manage the enterprises.1 47 The Constitu-
tion guarantees the right of worker self-management. 148 Firms oper-
ate as independent economic units without significant government
intervention. National economic plans are merely advisory and not
binding on the enterprises.1 49 They place minimal restrictions on
workers' managerial discretion.
Yugoslavia adopted a novel approach to foreign investment to
complement its unique social and economic system. The new legisla-
146. See Burzynski & Juergensmeyer, supra note 93, at 40-44; Scriven, Joint Ventures in
Poland, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 424, 429-30 (1980).
147. Glickman & Sukijasovic, Yugoslav Worker Management and Its Effect on Foreign
Investment, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 260 (1971); Peselj, Yugoslavia's Economy Looks to the
West, 2 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 46,47 (1970); E. LAMERS, JOINT VENTURES BETWEEN
YUGOSLAV AND FOREIGN ENTERPRISES 225-26 (1976); see generally YUGOSLAV CHAM-
BER OF ECONOMY, INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF FOREIGN
CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN YUGOSLAV ENTERPRISES (1972); C. MCMILLAN & D. ST.
CHARLES, supra note 35, at 45-50; Connor, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, 70 INT'L LAW 45
(1976).
148. Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 147, at 260-61.
149. Connor, supra note 147, at 46; Note, supra note 2, at 274-75.
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tion authorized 49% foreign participation in existing domestic enter-
prises. 150 Because society owns the means of production, the foreign
company's role had to be specified by contract between the investor
and the Yugoslav entity.151 Technically, the investor possessed con-
tractual rights, not an equity interest, in the venture. Joint projects
could be undertaken to improve the country's productivity, exports,
and technology.15 2 Foreign investment was not permitted, however, in
banking, insurance, commerce, or utilities.153 An investor had the
right to representation on the board of directors. Representation
could exceed the investor's relative equity position.154 A proportion-
ate share of the venture's annual hard currency earnings could be
remitted abroad, subject to a limit of one-third of the venture's net
foreign exchange earnings.155
Changes in the legislative framework in 1973, 1976, and 1978156
resulted in a more lenient approach to foreign equity participation.1 5 7
Joint ventures are expected to be long-term arrangements, and foreign-
ers can invest in existing enterprises or create new ones. 158 Investors
can remit up to half of their annual net hard currency earnings.1 59
They are also guaranteed return of their capital investment once the
objectives of the venture have been realized. 160 Foreigners can obtain
representation of up to 50% on the management board. The manage-
ment board must have the approval of the workers' council for deci-
sions involving income distribution, salary allocation, debt, and
investment planning.1 61
The laws exhibit a progressive, decentralized approach in that
they allow Yugoslav enterprises to contract directly with foreign
investors. In addition, the authority of Yugoslav enterprises to decide
150. Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 147, at 286.
151. Sukijasovic, Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia 37 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 474, 475 (1972); Note, supra note 2, at 275-78; Friedman, The Contractual
Joint Venture, 7 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 62 (1972); see also Revival of JV Trend in EE: A
Comparative Overview, 9 Bus. E. EUR. 203 (1980). Cf. Loeber, Capital Investment in Soviet
Enterprises?, 6 ADEL. L. REv. 337, 348-49 (1978) (arguing that Western investors may
retain ownership in assets that they contributed to the enterprise).
152. Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 147, at 286.
153. Id.; see also Connor, supra note 147, at 47.
154. Glickman & Sukijasovic, supra note 147, at 295; Connor, supra note 147, at 51.
155. Note, supra note 2, at 281.
156. Scriven, Yugoslavia's New Foreign Investment Law, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 95, 96-
100 (1979).
157. The current law continues to limit foreign participation to 49%, and investment is
forbidden in insurance, public administration, and domestic and foreign trade. BUSINESS
INTERNATIONAL, DOING BUSINESS IN EASTERN EUROPE II-3 (1980); see also Scriven,
supra note 156, at 103.
158. Business International, supra note 157, at IH-4.
159. Id. at H1-6.
160. Id. at H1-8.
161. Id. at H1-9; Scriven, supra note 156, at 101.
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matters of pricing, sales, distribution, and investment, in contrast to
the tight governmental control of Polish companies, enhances the eco-
nomic freedom of foreign participants in Yugoslav enterprises. The
Yugoslav laws, however, are conservative with respect to ownership.
Consistent with the socialist concept of state ownership, they mandate
a contractual joint venture relationship and exclude foreign investors
from formal equity rights. Moreover, Yugoslavia relegates foreign
investors to a minority positon, unlike Poland, which allows wholly
foreign-owned companies.
On balance, it is impossible to generalize and determine whether
Poland or Yugoslavia grants foreign investors more freedom. Never-
theless, Yugoslavia's approach is important in that it has provided a
benchmark for the other East European countries that have subse-
quently opened their doors to foreign investment.
B. ROMANIA
Romania has allowed mixed-capital companies since 1971.162
Foreigners who propose to invest in Romanian companies are required
to consult with various planning committees and ministries and need
the approval of the Council of Ministers. 163 Joint ventures must take
the form of joint stock or limited liability companies in which the for-
eign investors' share does not exceed 49%.16 Foreign investment is
permitted in the areas of industry, agriculture, construction, tourism,
and scientific and technical cooperation, provided that the investment
will benefit the national economy by improving technology or increas-
ing productivity or exports.165
Joint ventures are managed by a board of directors or a commit-
162. See generally Kuiper, Organization, Operation and Taxation of Joint Companies:
Taxation of Income Obtained by Non-Resident Individuals and Corporations, 16 EUR.
TAX'N 190 (1976); Morse & Goekjian, Joint Investment Opportunities with the Socialist
Republic of Romania, 29 Bus. LAW. 133 (1973); Schonfeld, Rumaniens gemischte Gesell-
schaften:--Paradebeispiel industrieller Ost-West-Kooperation?, 4 OSTEUROPA WIRT-
SCHAFT No. 4 (1977), at 301, translated in 13 Soy. & E. EUR. FOR. TRADE No. 4 (1978), at
25; M. SCHNITZER, supra note 44, at 113-14; Note, Joint Ventures in East Europe, 9 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 427 (1975).
163. Kuiper, supra note 162, at 191; C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35,
at 29-30; Morse & Goekjian, supra note 162, at 138-39; Business International, supra note
156, at IV-6.
164. Morse & Goekjian, supra note 161, at 136-39; C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES,
supra note 35, at 27; M. SCHNITZER, supra note 44, at 113-14. For a discussion of the
question of whether such rights stem from equity or contract, see Loeber, supra note 151, at
348-49; Gordon, supra note 29, at 291-92; Pfeifer, The Legal Framework for American
Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, 7 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 187, 194 (1974).
165. Morse & Goekjian, supra note 162, at 138; Business International, supra note 157,
at IV-3.
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tee consisting of managers and workers. 166 The foreign investor has
the right to participate in these management bodies and may negotiate
to require unanimous consent for major decisions 167 such as distribu-
tion of profits, appointment of management, and approval of financial
statements. Joint ventures are not subject to the requirements of the
national economic plan. They must, however, submit one-year and
five-year plans to the authorities in order to facilitate government
planning.1 68
Romanian joint ventures operate in a financial and economic
enclave outside the mainstream of the state economy. They must keep
their books in convertible currencies. Contracts between a joint ven-
ture and a Romanian or other East European party must, therefore, be
negotiated in hard currency.1 69 The foreign investor is entitled to
withdraw its share of the profits, after taxes.170
The special status of Romanian joint ventures creates significant
problems. The requirement that contracts be undertaken in converti-
ble currency makes it difficult to export goods to other East European
nations, which prefer to save hard currency for transactions with
Western suppliers.1 71 Mixed companies also have difficulties in pro-
curing supplies needed for production, because state companies have
priority under the economic plan.172 Overall, the isolation of mixed
companies from the remainder of the economy produces more
problems than benefits.
C. HUNGARY
In 1972, Hungary enacted legislation permitting joint ventures in
nonproductive activities such as trade, service, and research and devel-
opment.1 73 Joint ventures were expected to increase Hungary's tech-
166. Morse & Goekjian, supra note 162, at 140; Business International, supra note 157,
at IV-5.
167. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 28-29; Business International,
supra note 157, at IV-4; M. SCHNrrzER, supra note 44, at 115.
168. Morse & Goekjian, supra note 162, at 139; Business International, supra note 157,
at IV-7.
169. C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 35, at 28; Kuiper, supra note 162, at
192; Business International, supra note 157, at IV-5; Schonfeld, supra note 162, at 39.
170. Morse & Goekjian, supra note 162, at 140; C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES,
supra note 35, at 29; Business International, supra note 157, at IV-5.
171. M. SCHNrrZFR, supra note 44, at 121.
172. Id. at 122; Business International, supra note 157, at IV-11. Cf. Schonfeld, supra
note 162, at 39-40.
173. Decree No. 28 of the Minister of Finance of 3 Oct. 1972, on Economic Associations
with Foreign Participation, § 2, translated in 12 I.L.M. 989 (1973). See generally Dagon,
Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures with Socialist Business Associations: The Hun-
garian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752, 756-57 (1973); Schmidt, Legal Aspects of Doing
Business with and in Hungary, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 253, 269 (1982); Lorinczi &
Dorian, US.-Hungarian Joint Ventures: Prospects and Problems, 10 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
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nological capabilities. However, only three companies were formed
under the 1972 legislation. These companies did nothing more than
direct the production of the contracting Hungarian enterprise. 174 The
limited success of the program led to revisions of legislation in 1977,
1979, and 1982. These revisions allowed a broader role for foreign
investment.
Mixed companies may now, subject to approval from the Minis-
ter of Finance, engage in manufacturing, trade, services, and research
and development.175 Foreign equity in joint ventures is generally lim-
ited to 49%, but it is unlimited in banking, finance, and service compa-
nies. In addition, the government may permit greater participation at
its discretion.' 76 Investors are entitled to representation on the board
of directors in the proportion stipulated in the joint venture agree-
ment. 177 Moreover, the agreement may provide that certain board
decisions require unanimous consent, ensuring the minority share-
holder a veto power over corporate actions.' 78
Hungary has adopted an integrated approach to foreign invest-
ment regulation, treating joint ventures as if they were state enter-
prises. Thus, joint ventures must hold bank accounts in Hungarian
forints 179 and convert these into hard currency at government
exchange rates.'80 Joint companies must also maintain a "risk fund"
equivalent to 10% of invested capital in order to cover the firm's
potential losses.' 81
Joint venture transactions are subject to taxes on profits and cus-
Bus. 1205, 1219-20 (1978); C. MCMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLEs, supra note 35, at 61; M.
SCHNITZER, supra note 44, at 95.
174. Hungary: New Decree Breaks JVDeadlock, 8 Bus. E. EUR. 290 (1979); Schmidt,
supra note 173, at 269.
175. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, on Economic Associations
with Foreign Participation, § 2, translated in 17 I.L.M. 1451 (1978). See also Lorinezi &
Dorian, supra note 173, at 1220; Schmidt, supra note 173, at 269; Business International,
supra note 157, at 111-3.
176. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 4;
Schmidt, supra note 173, at 269-70; Lorinczi & Dorian, supra note 173, at 1222; Business
International, supra note 157, at 111-3. For a discussion of whether investors' rights stem
from equity or contract, see Loeber, supra note 151, at 348-49; Gordon, supra note 29, at
291-92; Pfeifer, supra note 164, at 194.
177. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 2(1);
Business International, supra note 157, at 111-3.
178. Business International, supra note 157, at 111-3; Schmidt, supra note 173, at 270;
Lorinczi & Dorian, supra note 173, at 1222.
179. Business International, supra note 157, at 111-3; Hungary: New Decree, supra note
174, at 290.
180. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 10;
Hungary: New Decree, supra note 174, at 290.
181. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 5;
Lorinczi & Dorian, supra note 173, at 1222; Schmidt, supra note 173, at 270.
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toms duties on imported products. 182 New profits from the venture
may be distributed to investors in proportion to their initial capital
contribution. The Hungarian National Bank guarantees hard cur-
rency remittance as stipulated in the joint contract. 183 The foreign
partner receives his share of proceeds upon liquidation. In this situa-
tion, the Hungarian National Bank guarantees any losses suffered as a
result of subsequent government actions or rulings.184
In 1982, Hungary authorized a special type of joint venture that
can be established in specified "duty free zones." These companies are
considered foreign legal entities and are exempt from Hungarian cus-
toms levies on imported machinery and components. 185 Western par-
ties can hold a majority position in banking and service companies,
and wage levels can exceed state wage guidelines to provide incentives
for employees. 18 6 The companies' books are to be maintained in hard
currency, with risk funds set aside to fund investment losses.187
By permitting two types of joint ventures, Hungary is attempting
to maximize investment opportunities for foreign capital. Although
this approach provides significant latitude for the investor, its effect on
increasing the inflow of currency and technology remains to be seen.
D. BULGARIA
In March, 1980, Bulgaria became the fifth East European nation
to authorize foreign equity investment.18 8 Bulgaria's approach is lib-
eral. It does not limit investors' equity share in joint enterprises, nor
does it restrict the portion of annual profits that can be remitted
abroad.18 9 Joint ventures can be established in industry, science and
technology, engineering, agriculture, construction, transportation, and
tourism.190 Joint venture agreements must be approved by the Coun-
182. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 7;
Hungary Offers Offshore Status to JVs, 11 Bus. E. EUR. 409 (1982).
183. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at § 1 (1);
Hungary: New Decree, supra note 174, at 291; Lorinczi & Dorian, supra note 173, at 1224;
Business International, supra 157, at 111-4.
184. Decree No. 7 of the Minister of Finance of 6 May 1977, supra note 175, at §§ 11,
13; Hungary: New Decree, supra note 174, at 291; Lorinczi & Dorian, supra note 173, at
1227; Business International, supra note 157, at 111-5.
185. Hungary Offers Offshore Status, supra note 182, at 409.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 409-10.
188. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council of 25 Mar. 1980, Bulgarian Official
Gazette No. 25, Mar. 28, 1980, translated in 19 I.L.M. 992 (1980); see also Kuiper, Bulga-
ria: New Joint Venture Legislation, 20 EUR. TAX'N 293 (1980); Bulgaria Issues First JV
Decree, 9 Bus. E. EUR. 129 (1980); Business International, supra note 157, at VI-3 through
VI-9.
189. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at §§ 9(3), 19;
Kuiper, supra note 188, at 296; Bulgaria Issues First JV Decree, supra note 188, at 129.
190. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at § 2(1); Kuiper,
supra note 188, at 293.
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cil of Ministers and are valid for a maximum of fifteen years.1 91
The joint venture agreement must specify the management struc-
ture of the enterprise. Parties may establish an administrative council
and a board of directors, although the chairmen of both organs must
be Bulgarian citizens. 192 Board decisions require the consent of all of
the represented parties.' 93
A joint enterprise is free to choose the most favorable currency
accounting method available,194 although the finances of the enterprise
must be handled by the Bulgarian partner.'95 Permissible methods
include a dual-appraisal approach under which the firm maintains
ledgers in convertible currency and in Bulgarian leva.196 By utilizing
this method, the joint venture can trade in Bulgarian leva with soft-
currency countries that are reluctant to forfeit scarce hard currency
reserves and still permit the investor to remit its share of the profits in
hard currency. 197 Joint companies are subject to a profits tax of up to
30%,198 to some customs duties, and to municipal taxes and fees.' 99
Although the Bulgarian foreign investment legislation is quite liberal,
few companies have established joint ventures. Perhaps Bulgaria's
image as the Soviet Union's most loyal East European satellite causes
Western investors to suspect that Bulgaria will renege on its liberal
legislation or apply it conservatively.
E. SOVIET UNION
The Soviet Union has the most conservative view of the proper
role of foreign equity in a socialist economy. The Soviet Union has a
long tradition of trade and cooperation with Western societies. For
example, merchants in the Middle Ages traded Russian furs for tex-
tiles and silver; Ivan the Great hired foreign architects to construct the
Kremlin; and Peter the Great created a civil service comprised of
191. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at §§ 5, 8. Section
8 of Decree No. 535 allows for an extension beyond the 15 years on request of the parties
and approval of the Council of Ministers. The ventures can, however, only be formed for a
maximum of 15 years. See also Bulgaria Issues First JV Decree, supra note 188, at 129;
Kuiper, supra note 188, at 294.
192. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at § 10; Bulgaria
Issues First JVDecree, supra note 188, at 130; Kuiper, supra note 188, at 294-95.
193. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at § 12; Bulgaria
Issues First JV Decree, supra note 188, at 130.
194. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgarian State Council, supra note 188, at § 13; Kuiper,
supra note 188, at 295.
195. Kuiper, supra note 188, at 295.
196. Business International, supra note 157, at VI-8; Kuiper, supra note 188, at 295;
Bulgaria Issues First JV Decree, supra note 188, at 130.
197. Kuiper, supra note 188, at 295; Bulgaria Issues First JVDecree, supra note 188, at
130; Business International, supra note 157, at VI-8.
198. Decree No. 535 of the Bulgaria State Council, supra note 188, at §§ 36, 37.
199. Kuiper, supra note 188, at 297.
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Swiss and German citizens. 2°° Nevertheless, current leaders are
unwilling to move beyond cooperative exchanges to permit foreign
equity in Soviet enterprises.201
Although the Soviet Union does not permit direct equity invest-
ment in Soviet enterprises,202 this policy does not eliminate profitable
cooperative arrangements between Soviet and Western parties. The
Soviets have participated in a broad range of cooperative agreements,
including the Kama River industrial complex and joint ventures with
Western firms in third countries.20 3 Because of the range of accommo-
dations which may be achieved through contractual arrangements,
Soviet leaders and prominent Western commentators agree that non-
equity arrangements may net the same benefits for investors as would
equity ventures in other East European economies.2°4
F. POLISH REGULATIONS IN CONTEXT
Permissible foreign investment in Poland differs significantly from
that of the five other countries discussed above. Poland has moved
beyond limited joint ventures such as those permitted in Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria, and has authorized wholly foreign-owned
companies or foreign-dominated joint ventures. In this regard, Polish
investment regulations are far more liberal than those of the other
countries. However, all four nations have placed varying degrees of
limitations on basic operational issues involved with these ventures.
These include limitations on the permissible fields of investment, the
percent of remittable earnings, the proportion of funds available for
distribution, and the composition of the controlling board.
200. Smith, The Russians Mean Business... About Business, 234 THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY No. 6, 41 (1974), at 43.
201. One Soviet official stated in 1979 that there would be no changes in policy that
would permit foreign shareholding in Soviet joint ventures. He indicated that any benefits
desired by foreign investors could be secured through contracts. Gvishiani Prospects and
Limits, supra note 42, at 89.
202. See Loeber, supra note 151, at 337.
203. See, e.g., Nobody Here But Us Marxists?, FORBES, July 15, 1971, at 48; Slappy,
Russia: The Curtain Rises on a New Trade Era, NATION's Bus., Nov. 1972, at 54; Cooking
Big Deals with Russia, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1971, at 28; Soviets Take a Joint Venture Road
West, Bus. WK., June 6, 1970, at 73; Voznesenkaia, Uchastie sovetskikh vneshnetorgovykh
organizatsii v smeshannykh obshchestvakh, SOVE'SKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 1977,
translated in 16 SOVIET L. & GOv'T No. 2, 58 (1977); East-West Joint Ventures Increase,
WORLD Bus. WEEKLY, Sept. 3, 1979, at 27.
204. See generally Berman, Joint Ventures Between United States Firms and Soviet Eco-
nomic Organizations, 1 INT'L TRADE L.J. 139 (1976); Pisar, The Changing Economic and
Legal Environmentfor East-West Investment, 10 INT'L LAW. 3 (1976); Gvishiani, Prospects
and Limits, supra note 42. Foreign investors' profits may be derived in the form of licens-
ing fees or as a percentage of production. Bank guarantees can protect the initial capital
invested, and product inspection rights can safeguard the quality of goods produced. See
generally Berman, supra; Pisar, supra; Friedman, supra note 151, at 62.
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Foreign investment through joint ventures is maintained within
the context of each country's social and economic framework. Joint
companies are therefore subject to regulations involving labor issues,
pricing and product distribution, and customs and tariff levels.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, although full managerial con-
trol in such strictly regulated economies as these may be of limited
value, Poland is still the only country that has authorized wholly for-
eign-owned companies to operate in the context of a socialist
economy.
Even greater restrictions are imposed by Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union. These nations permit only the more limited contractual
agreements, in which investors' rights are specified in the joint venture
agreement. It is difficult to compare rights accorded investors under
such a system with the rights granted to wholly foreign-owned compa-
nies in Poland. The Soviets argue that all equity interests can be effec-
tively assured through contract, and foreign investors in Yugoslavia
have apparently concurred with this view. Polish regulations reach
beyond contractual interests because investors retain sole operating
control over the enterprise without sharing that power with the state.
The investor's decision-making capacity to maneuver within this sys-
tem is thereby preserved, even though the firm's ability to operate is
constrained by the restrictions enumerated above. In this manner the
Polish regulations offer more flexibility than either the Yugoslav or the
Soviet contractual agreements, which do not appear to permit such
autonomy at all.
V. OWNERSHIP IN CONTEXT
The enactment of laws allowing joint investment in Yugoslavia,
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland has not resulted in a rush of
Western capital into East Europe. In fact, only Yugoslavia has
enjoyed a significant inflow of technology and investment in joint ven-
ture form. In 1983, of the 211 equity joint ventures created in the five
countries enumerated above, 200 were established in Yugoslavia and
none were created in Poland.20 5 Although investors have been reluc-
tant to join state companies as investment partners, many have flocked
to the more autonomous forms of East European equity participation.
Poland's disappointing experience with joint ventures can be con-
trasted with the stunning success of the Polonia companies. These
wholly foreign-owned enterprises have experienced explosive growth,
increasing from a total of 100 in 1982 to approximately 500 in 1983.206
205. The Challenge to Js: Survival of the Concept, 12 Bus. E. EUR. 25 (1983).
206. Poland Eases JVLaw, Invites Foreign Investors, 11 Bus. E. EUR. 197 (1982); Invest-
ing in Poland's Small Businesses, 11 Bus. E. EUR. 332 (1982); Weralski, New Rules Affect-
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In June, 1982, wholly foreign-owned companies employed 3,000 work-
ers and had sales of $38 million, $2 million of which was from
exports.20 7 One journal reported that the 251 companies surveyed in
1982 had turnover of $181 million, including $8.4 million in
exports.20 8 The Polish government, apparently embarrassed by the
financial success of the foreign-owned enterprises, is reportedly pre-
paring legislation to reduce their profitability. 20 9
Insofar as ownership connotes control and the freedom to man-
age operations without state interference, investors' preference for
Yugoslav and Polish operations is understandable. Although there are
some restrictions on investments and profits, the freedom provided by
Yugoslav and Polonia companies more closely approximates the man-
agerial autonomy available in market economies than does traditional
joint venture autonomy tempered with significant state participation.
Investors are unwilling to share decision-making power over the daily
operations of a company with a state bureaucracy. Firms that have
attempted larger joint ventures have encountered difficulties. These
include protracted negotiations, poor-quality products, delays in
obtaining supplies, and difficulty in selling hard-currency-priced prod-
ucts in soft-currency countries.
Although, in 1980, enthusiasm and legislation concerning joint
ventures was growing, the number of cooperation agreements contin-
ued to increase. 210 Various reports place the number of agreements in
force between Western investors and East European and Yugoslav
enterprises during the 1970s at between 480 and 2,000.211 Investors'
preference for cooperation agreements over joint equity arrangements
becomes apparent when these data are compared with statistics
regarding joint ventures in Eastern Europe.
The variety of objectives sought by Western investors from
expansion into East European markets makes their lack of a uniform
investment strategy unsurprising. An investor will choose the most
advantageous option available for the transaction, whether this
ing JVs and Foreign Businesses, 23 EUR. TAX'N 144 (1983). It is significant that investors
in both Yugoslav joint ventures and Polonia companies have considerable discretion to
make business decisions without interference by the state bureaucracy.
207. Poland Eases JV Law, supra note 206.
208. 12 Bus. E. EUR. 226 (1983).
209. 12 Bus. E. EUR. 74 (1983).
210. Revival of JV Trend, supra note 151, at 203.
211. UN Reports on East-West Cooperation Agreement, 8 Bus. E. EUR. 114 (1979);
Sadowska-Cieslak, Kooperacja przemyslowa wschod-zachod, 25 HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY,
No. 12 1980, at 35; Kozinski, Miejsce Polski w kooperacjiprzemyslowej wschod-zachod, 23
HANDEL ZAGRANICZNY, No. 9 1978, at 26; Bogomolov, Ekonomicheskie sviazi mezhdu
sotsialisticheskimi i kapitalisticheskimi stranami, MIROVAIA EICONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENJIA No. 3 (1980), at 41, translated in 12 SOviET & E. EUR.
FOREIGN TRADE No. 3 (1981), at 64.
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involves joint venture-equity status or more traditional contractual
cooperation. In Poland, only the promise of 100% equity has sparked
investor interest in corporate ownership. Investment in larger-scale
equity joint ventures with Polish state entities has not materialized.
Investors' enthusiastic response to investment forms that bypass
shared control with the state reflects the perceived value of control in
the foreign investment setting. When sharing control with state enter-
prises is required, investors have chosen the cooperation-contractual
form of East European operation. When substantial investor control
can be exercised at the enterprise level, as in Yugoslavia and Poland,
businessmen have taken the added risk of direct capital investment in
the economy. Polish lawmakers are gambling that Western firms will
continue to take this risk.

